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Intellectual property is probably one of the most contentious fields of
contemporary legal studies, but it is at the same time, to a large extent, a
discipline still in search of identity. Not surprisingly, the historical and
theoretical foundations of intellectual property have attracted increasing
attention from researchers, within and beyond the boundaries of law. Not more
than fifteen years ago, the essential bibliography on copyright history in
English language could have been wrapped up in one single footnote, and a
long footnote could have accommodated the main literature on the history of
all intellectual property rights as such. This is certainly no longer the case
today. Historical research on the legal, theoretical, and social foundations of
intellectual property has proliferated in many directions. It has transformed
from an ancillary subject at the periphery of the intellectual property debate
into one that attracts the foremost scholars in the field.
The book LANDMARK CASES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW,
edited by Jose Bellido, inscribes itself into this fertile ground of scholarship. It
stands out, first of all, for the quality of the contributors, who are authors of
some of the most authoritative and most-cited works on intellectual property
history. Although first-hand research into litigation has been part and parcel of
this field for a long time, not many works have systematically collected
original contributions along the common thread of case law analysis. The most
significant precedent in this genre is probably the remarkable collection of
essays on leading US cases edited by Jane Ginsburg and Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss over a decade ago. 1
The interpretation of intellectual property history through the lenses of
institutional and commercial practices, such as licensing and litigation
strategies, is one of the distinctive features of Jose Bellido’s scholarship. 2 The
“case studies” methodology that defines this book shares the same rationale,
namely – as Bellido puts it in his chapter – that “there is much to be gained in
looking at the background of the dispute, its emergence, and how it is litigated
by the protagonists.” (p. 206).
The thirteen cases selected for this book are all by British courts, with one
exception for a decision coming from the European Court of Justice. The time
span starts in the 1600s, when patents were still called “monopolies” and
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copyright was not yet even a word, and ends in the present days, under the
growing influence of European Union law (still formally binding in the United
Kingdom at the moment of writing this review). What makes the selected
cases landmarks in intellectual property law?
As acknowledged by Jose Bellido in his preface, there are a number of reasons
why a particular legal dispute marks an historical turning-point. In the most
classical sense, it is so because of the disputes’ enduring legacy as legal
precedent, typically due to the way in which a particular legal principle has
been established. Alternatively, the landmark quality may depend on the
matter around which the controversy arose, for example when a new
technology or business practice challenges established norms. In a more
general sense, a case stands out if it has something crucial to say that goes
beyond the facts of the litigation, and perhaps also beyond the boundaries of
law.
A glance at the table of contents reveals that the choice of cases corresponds
only partially to the typical reading list of IP courses. Evidently, the editor and
the contributors were less preoccupied with ticking the boxes of an ideal list
than to make an original and unique contribution to scholarship. There are
typically two ways of advancing knowledge and understanding in a legal
discipline through case studies: either you raise the attention to cases that have
not yet received adequate consideration, or you tackle well-known cases from
a fresh perspective. The book does both of these things. On the one side, it
challenges the acquired assumptions on classical authorities and, on the other,
it expands the notional catalogue of benchmark cases by pointing to
“unorthodox” and less researched authorities.
Taken as a whole, these thirteen cases traversing five centuries of British
history tell a story with many layers of meaning. First, and more obviously,
there is a story of legal disputes and litigation, with their tangled backgrounds
of business and personal micro-histories that frequently intertwine with the
broader societal, cultural, and economic dimensions. This story entails also a
narrative of legal strategies adopted by counsels, and how these strategies
succeeded or failed, thereby influencing the development of the discipline. On
another level, this same litigation describes a discipline in search of identity:
different legal threads with diverse statutory or common law origins that only
at a very late stage converge under the common umbrella construct of
“intellectual property”. This narrative seems to suggest that such convergence
is not just the outcome of contingent factual circumstances, but unfolds a
pattern that is deeply entrenched in the specific British legal tradition. Indeed,
it is in this tradition that “property” emerged more prominently as the common
thread that unites interests as diverse as those of authors, inventors, and trade
mark owners. In this connection, there is at least another layer of meaning,
which remains largely implicit in the book: it is the story of how different
legal traditions, across the world, have shaped the fundamental principles of
the discipline and how these traditions have influenced each other over the
years.
The book is a treasure trove of insights into all of these layers. It begins by
revisiting the impact of early statutory law on “monopolies”, with Sean
Bottomley’s enlightening reading of Mansell v Bunger (1626), and then
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embarks in a long epistemological journey with a number of direct and
indirect cross-references.
In the course of this journey, the book is not afraid of reopening some of the
most prominent “dossiers” of intellectual property history and theory. One of
these is the 18th Century’s “literary property debate”, revolving around the
question of whether there is an authors’ property right protected at common
law that precedes and exceeds the limited right created by the statute. Because
of its vast implications on the origin, purpose, and limits of copyright, the
question continues to attract attention from copyright historians and theorists
alike. 3 The chapter by H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui on Stationers v Seymour
(1677) contributes to a better understanding of the debate. Based on the
analysis of newly discovered manuscript reports and records, GómezArostegui makes a convincing case that the reliance on this precedent by
supporters of the subsistence of a common law intangible right vested in
authors was by no means wrong. “In short,” Gómez-Arostegui tells us, “a
number of lawyers and judges in the late seventeenth century believed that an
author’s right in literary property was a plausible basis for argument, even
though no statue expressly mentioned authors’ rights before 1710.” (p. 54).
This means that “the notion of an antecedent [authors’] right at common law
was not fanciful or novel.” (p. 54).
To be sure, this finding does not change the fact that the notion of a perpetual
authors’ right at common-law, and the related narrative of the author as
proprietor of a transferable object of property, was largely instrumental to the
interests of publishers, to whom the alleged right could be transferred. 4 This
story, which has been elsewhere described as the “latent story about
commodification of knowledge”, 5 seems to be confirmed by the other
copyright cases discussed in the book. Indeed, perhaps not surprisingly, in
none of these cases are the authors’ personal interests the driving cause or the
main issue at stake.
The argument developed in Gómez-Arostegui’s chapter is echoed in Barbara
Lauriat’s discussion of a later case, widely acknowledged as seminal in AngloAmerican copyright law, namely the House of Lords decision in Walter v
Lane (1900). The case revolved around newspaper reports of oral speeches.
Although the focus was on copyright subsistence in these reports, the question
of whether oral speeches as such attract common law copyright was at the
background of the litigation. Lauriat’s thorough reconstruction of the facts
seems to suggest that the litigation may not have happened, should the author
of the speeches (the Earl of Rosebery) not have wrongly assumed that he did
not own any copyright to assert against Lane to prevent the publication of his
addresses. Yet the chapter makes an even more important point, which sheds
new light into the persisting legacy of this case as an authority for the British
concept of originality. This authority, argues Lauriat, is questionable, not
because of its incompatibility with the modern, “higher” standard developed at
the European level, but because it is not to be regarded as a case on originality
in the first place. It is, rather, a case on authorship. The teaching of the case is
not that reports qualify as “original” literary works, but that reports attract
copyright despite not being original works of authorship – and this is because
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“there was nothing in the statute that suggested only an ‘original composition’
would gain copyright protection.” (p. 168).
The divorce between authors’ interests and the actual operation of copyright
law is perhaps another “latent history” that the book helps unveil. In fact, the
dispute in Walter v Lane was carried out in complete disregard of the author’s
reluctance to be dragged into a lawsuit. In Sayer v Moore (1785), the first of a
series of cases on alleged copyright infringement in maps and charts
thoroughly discussed by Isabella Alexander (pp. 59-86), cartographers played
a major role, but only as expert witnesses of the court. The representation of
the author of the Popeye comic strip and his heir is a controversial aspect of
King Feature Syndicate (1940), as presented by Jose Bellido. This case is best
remembered for the emergence of copyright “as an economic and social
platform for licensing and merchandising activities” where syndication, and
not authorship, was “the basis of the intangible property rights.”(p. 230).
There is another landmark element in the King Feature case, namely the role
played by the counsel’s strategy in pursuing a test case with very uncertain
results. The choice of the court in which to bring proceedings is a distinctive
point of interest in Day v Day, Day and Martin (1816), a litigation that
“signalled a shift in trademark enforcement practice.” (p. 87) and that forms
the basis of Lionel Bently’s insightful discussion of early trademark history.
One century later, in R v Johnstone (2003), a case involving counterfeited
CDs, the plaintiff’s counsel sued on trade mark infringement grounds, instead
on the more logical copyright infringement grounds, because of the stronger
criminal sanctions then available under the Trade Marks Act of 1994. In this
case, however, the strategy did not pay off, as the House of Lords famously
concluded that the use of registered trademarks such as “Bon Jovi” in the front
cover of bootlegged CDs was not a “use as a trade mark”. In her analysis,
Elena Cooper focuses on a further element of interest of this ruling, namely
the relationship between civil and criminal law in intellectual property, and
explains why the court rightly refrained from establishing “closer analogies
between intellectual property crime and the law of theft.” (p. 343).
The precedent set by R v Johnston as to the trade mark function had short life
due to the subsequent jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, whose
landmark ruling on functionality in Lego Juris v OHIM (2010) is the focus of
the last chapter of the book. Alain Pottage contextualizes the case on the
background of the aggressive strategy pursued by the Danish company to
extend its expired patent rights. “The [Lego] brick is so thoroughly implicated
in the history of intellectual property law – Pottage tells us – that one could
imagine taking it as the vehicle of an engaging and expansive course in
intellectual property law” (p. 347). Pottage takes the brick as a vehicle for the
understanding of how the nature and operation of trade mark law has evolved
at the interface between EU and national jurisprudence.
However, the area of intellectual property where British jurisprudence has
engaged more intensively with doctrines and principles from other European
traditions is probably patent law. The three chapters on the modern patent
system cover systematically the foundational elements of the law, namely
subject matter qualification, obviousness, and construction of the scope of the
claims. The latter is discussed extensively in Seymour Mauskopf’s chapter on
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Nobel Explosives Company v Anderson (1894), which digs critically into the
origin of the British approach to claim interpretation. The contentious issue of
subject matter eligibility is tackled by Brad Sherman with reference to Slee &
Harris’s Application (1966), one of the earliest decisions on computer
programs. Another controversial subject matter, biotech inventions, is at the
centre stage of Biogen v Medeva (1996). Luke McDonagh provides a critical
re-reading Lord Hoffmann’s judgment on obviousness and sufficiency in the
context of the emergence of a disruptive technology.
The book pays the right tribute to common-law intellectual property in two of
its chapters. Hazel Carty presents an elegant and articulated analysis of
Spalding v Gamage (1915), the leading authority on the law of passing-off.
The widespread legacy of Coco v Clark (1969) for the law of breach of
confidence is discussed in Tanya Aplin’s chapter. The surprising influence of
this lower court decision across different jurisdictions is examined by a
systematic quantitative and qualitative analysis of citations, which provides
remarkable insights into the many trajectories followed by this legacy.
In its diversity of approaches, directions, and methodologies, the book offers a
thoughtful opportunity to rethink the foundations of intellectual property, as
well as its purpose and future. It will be an indispensable work of reference for
research in the years to come.
ENDNOTES
1

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES, Jane C. Ginsburg and Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, eds. (Foundation Press, 2006).
2
See e.g. Jose Bellido and Fiona Macmillan, Music Copyright after
Collectivisation, I.P.Q. 231-246 (2016); Jose Bellido and Kathy Bowrey, From
the Author to the Proprietor: Newspaper Copyright and The Times (18421956), 6 J. of Media Law, 206-233 (2014); Jose Bellido, Codified Anxieties:
Literary Copyright in Mid-Nineteenth Century Spain, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW, Isabella
Alexander and H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, eds. (Edward Elgar, 2016), 423443.
3
See in particular Mark Rose, AUTHORS AND OWNERS. THE
INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (Harvard University Press, 1993), 92-101;
Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, THE MAKING OF MODERN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 919; Ronan Deazley, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT: HISTORY, THEORY,
LANGUAGE (Edward Elgar, 2006), 16-25; Abraham Drassinower, WHAT’S
WRONG WITH COPYING? (Harvard University Press, 2015), 152-155.
4
See Mark Rose, AUTHORS AND OWNERS, 111-112.
5
Abraham Drassinower, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING?, 155.
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PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A
GLOBAL CONSENSUS, edited by C. Bradford Biddle, Jorge. L.
Contreras, Brian J. Love, and Norman V. Siebrasse. Cambridge University
Press, 2019. pp. xxxiii + 344, Hardcover, $125, and Open Access.
Reviewed by Bernard Chao
University of Denver
Sturm College of Law
bchao@law.du.edu
Twenty leading scholars from around the world worked on the International
Patent Remedies for Complex Products (“INPRECOMP”) project. One of the
fruits of this project is the book entitled PATENT REMEDIES AND
COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS. The title
reveals the book and indeed the project’s aspirations: “to seek international
consensus on issues affecting remedies in the context of complex products”
(p.xxvii). The participants undoubtedly understood that this lofty goal was
overly ambitious. In this complex global system, there are too many diverse
viewpoints and agendas to achieve real consensus. Nonetheless, the authors
have done an admirable job describing some of the most important issues in
patent remedies law and setting forth different approaches countries have used
to address these issues.
The book frames the problems that complex products pose by initially noting,
“[w]e no longer live in a world of simple inventions where the patented
technology provides most, if not all, of the value of an end product” (p.xxi). A
single end product (e.g., smartphone) may contain thousands of technologies
that are covered by “tens or even hundreds of thousands of individuals patents
issued by patent offices across the globe” (p.1). These patent “thickets” make
it immensely difficult to calibrate patent remedies in way that satisfies two
competing interests: 1) incentivizing invention by adequately compensating
patent holders, and 2) promoting follow-on innovation. If the law provides too
weak a set of remedies, it will under incentivize invention. 1 On the other
hand, making remedies too powerful can stifle follow on innovation. 2 The
challenge for policymakers and judges is determining where to draw the
different lines.
PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS divides the issues into
seven chapters. The first four chapters discuss specific remedies, namely:
“Reasonable Royalties”, “Lost Profit and Disgorgement”, “Enhanced
Damages, Litigation Cost Recovery, and Interest”, and “Injunctive Relief”.
The next three chapters then cover issues that makes this first set of topics
even more complicated: “The Effect of FRAND Commitments on Patent
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Remedies”, “The Effect of Competition Law on Patent Remedies” and
“Holdout, Holdup and Royalty Stacking: A Review of the Literature.”
The book is well suited for readers of varying levels of expertise and patience.
For those seeking bottom line answers, the book begins with a helpful
“Executive Summary” that briefly summarizes the different chapter’s principal
recommendations. Each chapter starts by introducing fundamental concepts
associated with the topic. The chapters then delve into many of the nuances
associated with each topic. In many cases, the deeper dive describes issues
that even some experts may not have considered. By discussing a sample of
relevant examples, this review seeks to illustrate both the breadth and depth of
the book’s coverage. Indeed, PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX
PRODUCTS is currently the most comprehensive source of information about
how patent remedies law is applied to modern complex products.
U.S stakeholders will want to pay special attention to the chapter on
reasonable royalties. Since 2010, roughly 82% of patent cases that awarded
damages included reasonable royalty awards. 3 Chapter 1 provides a wholistic
treatment of the topic. It starts by providing a brief look at the numbers by
highlighting studies that discuss how often reasonable royalty awards are
awarded and what average awards are in the United States (different studies
suggest that the range may be from $3.5 to $5.8 million) (pp.6-7). Although
less data is available outside the United States, we still learn that awards are
smaller in Japan (only 5 cases exceeded $1.7 million over a fourteen-year
period) and rarer in China. The Chapter also briefly explores the theoretical
justifications for awarding reasonable royalties and the principal approaches
for calculating them. Of course, there is the discussion of the fifteen Georgia
Pacific factors and its many failings.
But PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS is not merely a
descriptive view of the law, the authors make recommendations. Like others
have done before, Chapter 1 suggests narrowing the number of factors that
juries consider. 4 In their variation of this reform, the focus is on: 1)
determining incremental value, 2) assessing market evidence, and 3) then
using the two prior steps as checks against each other. I am particularly
heartened by two aspects of the discussion.
First, when Chapter 1 describes incremental value, it does not assume that the
entire value of a product is made up by the various patents that cover the
product. The Chapter acknowledges that taking a product to market requires
“manufacturing, distribution, marketing, process refinement . . ..” and
concludes that a royalty should reflect “compensation to the party who made
the investments and shouldered the risks related to these ancillary services”
(p.24) 5 This is a nuance that courts can overlook, and it is important to remind
everyone that it is not just about patents.
Second, I am delighted that there is also a discussion of cognitive bias in
Chapter 1. When explaining the justifications for the entire market value rule
and requiring royalties to be based on the smallest saleable unit, the authors
discuss anchoring – the tendency to give undue weight to the first number they
encounter (p.43). Law and psychology studies have repeatedly shown that
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people are subject to a variety of such cognitive biases. These insights have
important implications in many legal contexts, and patent law is no exception.
Patent juries literally make billion-dollar decisions. Policymakers and
practicing attorneys need to understand how juries think. For example, my
own recent mock jury study with Roderick O’Dorisio revealed that juries often
use damages to punish companies even when they are instructed to award
compensatory damages. 6 Insights like these can help courts and policymakers
calibrate new remedy policies that takes these heuristics into account.
Chapters 2-4 provide a similar treatment of lost profits, enhanced damages,
and injunctions. For all three topics, the book provides a good baseline
description of the doctrine, including some discussion of jurisdictions outside
the United States. Then each chapter discusses some important nuances and
provides a few recommendations. For the most part, these descriptions are
extremely informative and provide a fair treatment of the law. And although I
do not always agree with the recommendations, they are all certainly worthy
of serious discussion.
My primary disagreement with the book concerns Chapter 3’s
recommendations on the treatment of unpatented goods and apportionment.
The chapter advocates for legal rules that award lost profits associated with the
sale of unpatented goods so long as the patentee can show causation. The
chapter also endorses Mentor Graphics v. Eve USA, a Federal Circuit decision
rejecting the idea of apportioning lost profits. 7 At its core, both of these
recommendations reflect what Ted Sichleman has called “make-whole”
remedies and they are controversial. Scholarship by Sichelman, Eric Bensen,
Amy Landers, Mark Lemley and myself have all staked out positions that
seem inconsistent with Chapter 3’s view on lost profits. 8 In one form or
another, we have all argued that rents should be split between initial
innovators and later follow-on innovators. These views are fundamentally
inconsistent with the idea of basing remedies purely on “but for” causation,
the justification Chapter 3 relies on in making its recommendations. While
this portion of Chapter 3 certainly has its own advocates (including ample
precedent), I wish the book had at least acknowledged that the issue is more
controversial than the authors seem to suggest. 9
I found the other parts of PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX
PRODUCTS less objectionable and more helpful. Chapter 5 was particularly
informative. It discusses the effect that FRAND (fair reasonable and nondiscriminatory) commitments have on remedies for standards-essential patents
(“SEPs”). Early on, Chapter 5 sketches out to how to determine royalty rates
using a “top down” approach, an approach that is quite different than the
“bottom up” reasonable royalty calculation that most U.S. patent experts are
familiar with. The top down approach begins by determining the aggregate
royalty burden that a standard should bear. It then seeks to find the particular
portion of that royalty that individual SEPs should receive. Although the top
down approach appears to have only been used in the SEP context, it seems
that courts may want to consider borrowing aspects of this approach for any
product covered by a large number of patents.
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Perhaps because FRAND commitments have no borders, Chapter 5 explores
international law in greater depth than some of the other chapters. There are
discussions of several relevant international FRAND decisions including the
Court of Justice of the European Union’s landmark decision in Huawei v.
ZTE. 10 Huawei v. ZTE describes the procedural steps that a SEP holder must
follow if it wishes to seek an injunction against an unlicensed implementer
without violating European Competition law. Chapter 5 also provides an
appendix that summarizes how different the laws of different countries assess
monetary FRAND damages. The appendix includes a discussion of the laws
of Germany, Switzerland, Korea, Japan, and China. Importantly, the entire
book (including the Appendix) provides citations to source material so that the
reader can research specific topics in greater depth. Because the implications
of a FRAND commitment is probably one of the least well-developed areas of
patent remedies, Chapter 5 probably has the most potential to educate and
influence policymakers and judges.
Of course, these are just a few of the many issues covered by PATENT
REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS. In short, for both practicing
attorneys and policymakers interested in how patent remedies should and do
work for complex products, PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX
PRODUCTS is an excellent book with a wealth of helpful information.
ENDNOTES
1

See generally Adam B. Jaffe, et al, eds., , Navigating the Patent Thicket:
Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, And Standard Setting, in Vol. 1 INNOVATION
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, VOL. 1, 119 (2001) (describing the patent
thicket problem).
2
See generally, Suzanne Scotchmer, , Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 32 (1991)
3
Unpublished results of review author’s search on Lex Machina of all patent
cases filed after January 1, 2010 that resulted in a monetary damages award as
of February 20, 2020. 230 out of the 281 cases found resulted in an award of
reasonable royalty damages.
4
See, e.g., Hon. Arthur J. Gajarsa, William F. Lee, A. Douglas Melamed,
Breaking the Georgia- Pacific Habit: A Practical Proposal to Bring Simplicity
and Structure to Reasonable Royalty Damages Determinations, 26 Tex. Intell.
Prop. L.J. 51, 52 (2018); Stuart Graham et. al., Final Report of the Berkeley
Center for Law & Technology Patent Damages Workshop 15 August 2016, 25
Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 115,140 (2017)
5
See also Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable
Royalties, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 655, 663–64 (2009)
6
Bernard Chao & Roderick O’Dorisio, Saliency, Anchors & Frames, A
Multicomponent Damages Experiment, 26 Mich. Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2019).
7
Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
8
Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 Tex.
L.Rev.517 (2014) (arguing that “make- whole” remedies are ill suited for
patent law); Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment of Lost Profits in Contemporary
Damages Cases, 10 Va. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2005) (making the historical case for
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apportioning lost profits), Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment,
Patentee Injury, and Sequential Invention, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 471, 504509 (2012) (arguing that dividing rents among different innovators optimizes
innovation); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free
Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1046 (2005) (“The assumption that intellectual
property owners should be entitled to capture the full social surplus of their
invention runs counter to our economic intuitions in every other segment of
the economy.”); Bernard Chao, Lost Profits in a Multicomponent World, 59
B.C. L. Rev. 1321 (2018) (arguing that lost profits should be apportioned); see
also Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent
Infringement Deterrent, 74 Mo. L Rev. 909, 931 (2009) (“[T]he ‘convoyed
sales’ doctrine . . . overcompensate[s] patent owners by allowing them to earn
a royalty on value they did not create.”).
9
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(allowing for the recovery of lost profits of complementary goods that do not
practice the patent); Roger D. Blair and Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent
Damages, 10 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1, 2 (2001) (defending remedies based on
“but for” causation).
10
Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp., C-170/13 ECJ (2015).
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UNITED STATES V. APPLE: COMPETITION IN AMERICA, by Chris
Sagers. Harvard University Press, 2019. pp. 336, Hardcover, $29.95.
Reviewed by Shubha Ghosh
Syracuse University
College of Law
Sghosh01@law.syr.edu
That Professor Sagers has written an ambitious book is demonstrated in its
subtitle. “Competition in America” covers a lot of ground, from the stock
market to the football field. Competition fuels America, moving it forward.
But competition also can slam on the brakes suddenly and frighteningly, as
with deep economic downturns or failures to respond to crises, like a
pandemic. These tensions are at the heart of this engaging and important book.
Professor Sagers uses the 2012 antitrust prosecution against Apple and the
major book publishers as the catalyst for his exegesis on competition. The
United States Department of Justice (along with the attorneys-general of
several states) alleged that Apple and the book publishers had conspired to
raise the price of e-Books, violating the Sherman Act’s prohibition against
restraints of trade. While the publishers settled, Apple proceeded to trial where
the district court ruled in favor of the government. 1 According to Judge
Denise Cole, Apple had orchestrated a conspiracy among publishers to
implement a set of contractual terms in its agreements with authors that would
raise the price of e-Books. These terms were a per se violation of the Sherman
Act.
The Second Circuit affirmed in a 2-1 decision whose rationale was divided. 2
Judge Debra Ann Livingston, writing for the majority, found Apple liable
under a rule of reason analysis, which entails a balancing of anticompetitive
and procompetitive effects. Judge Raymond Lohier concurred with the result
and the factual findings but would have affirmed on the district court’s per se
ruling. Finally, Judge Dennis Jacobs dissented, reasoning that Apple had acted
pro-competitively and therefore did not violate the Sherman Act.
Professor Sagers provides context for these various judicial decisions for those
not fully familiar with antitrust doctrines. Standards for liability, whether rule
of reason or per se, reflect compromises over interpretations of the phrase
“restraint of trade,” starting with Judge Taft’s famous decision in Addyston
Pipe & Steel on illegal and ancillary restraints. 3 Economic justification for
these standards developed through economic thinking in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Professor Sagers presents these economic developments in
great and, for some, familiar detail. His presentation is relatively clear and
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accurate while being critical of some of the underlying assumptions. There is a
lot to be said about how economics translates into law and policy, and the
book suggests some of the problems. Professor Sagers alludes to the
limitations in a brief discussion of the German Historical School in the late
nineteenth century. Some readers may be disappointed by this attention, short
relative to the pages devoted to the more well-known marginalist analysis.
But, as I suggest below, what the book may lack in theoretical discussion is
compensated for in some very engaging institutional and historical discussion
of the publishing industry.
In focusing on marginalist economic theory, with its emphasis on the
centrality of price as determined by free markets, Professor Sagers highlights
limitations in our understanding of competition. Antitrust economics relies on
the mantra of voluntary transactions negotiated through price among many
actors on the seller and buyer sides of the market. These transactions translate
into marginalist terms of utility, revenue, and cost, which in turn imply the
benefits of competition, quality products provided at affordable prices. These
idealized transactions are abstracted from real world business decisions and
market dynamics. Competition’s virtues are gauged by results; if prices are
low, competition is functioning.
The Apple litigation shows why this abstracted view of competition is limiting
and misleading. Apple and the publishers sought to counter the perceived
threat from Amazon, a company that was selling inexpensive e-books while
limiting compensation for authors. By agreeing not to sell e-books below a set
price, the practice termed “minimum resale price maintenance”, the publishers
and Apple were seeking to promote competition in publishing by supporting
authors and bringing quality new books to readers. Contrary to these
competitive goals, the Second Circuit, applying antitrust law, focused on the
increased prices by Apple and competitive virtues of Amazon, namely lower
prices for consumers. Consequently, Apple’s agreement with the publishers
must violate the Sherman Act, the Court reasoned.
Professor Sagers dissects the Second Circuit’s logic by pointing to
contemporary public attitudes about Amazon, markets, and competition.
Consumer purchases attest to Amazon’s popularity. At the same time, there is
a wariness, perhaps more among some antitrust theorists than among
consumers, about Amazon’s ubiquity in the marketplace. The company’s size
raises concerns about its dominance and its possible anticompetitive practices.
These concerns in turn reflect doubts over markets and economic theories of
competition as benefitting consumers. Instead, public perception is that
markets lead to scaling up and size to the detriment of consumers despite the
dubious predictions of marginalist economics. Apple’s agreement with
publishers is a competitive response to the anticompetitive conduct of
Amazon. Its low prices do not result from Amazon’s competitive superiority
but from predatory conduct, a rapacious form of competition.
Conflicting public attitudes towards competition belie assessments of United
States v. Apple. Society appreciates competition but deplores competitiveness.
There is the Greek ideal of agon, which is the competition of the sports field
and of battle that stems from an internal conflict among ambition, aspiration,
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and discontent. But there is the reality of greed, selfishness, and rivalry. What
Professor Sagers reveals, at least to me, is how the ambiguous appeal of
competition leads to confusion within antitrust law as to means and ends.
Antitrust law may not know its goals or how to reach them.
But from this disconcerting message, to be fair perhaps only Professor Sagers’
subtext, grows some constructive messages. The best part of this book is the
detailed history of the publishing industry in the United States. Some of the
details are familiar, but most demonstrate a valuable integration of
institutional and economic analysis. Professor Sagers teaches us about actual
business practices but provides an effective theoretical explanation for why
these practices were adopted and their implications for publishers, authors, and
readers. This portion of the book makes up for the scant attention to the
German Historical approach to economics, mentioned too briefly. The slight is
made up for by illustration. Professor Sagers’ discussion of book publishing
shows the German Historical School in action, and the illustration brings to
life the competition in the book market with its dysfunctions. I was reminded
of a forthcoming book chapter by Professor Robert Spoo on the tacit
agreement regarding the publication of James Joyce’s poems among US book
publishers in the early Twentieth Century. 4 Both Professors Sagers and Spoo
are exemplars of how to communicate about specific markets and business
practices in nuanced and insightful ways.
Within antitrust law, all competitive markets are the same while
anticompetitive markets are different in their own ways. It is the differences
that are hard to respond to. The appeal of marginalist economic analysis in
antitrust law is how amenable it is to rule-like application. A per se rule
against price fixing follows from the theoretical benefits of price competition.
Rule of reason rests on careful analyses of pricing, marginal costs, and
deadweight loss, each of which can be diagrammed and statistically discerned.
By contrast, an historical analysis is open ended without a clear “ought” to
guide legal decision making. I finished Professor Sagers book with a mixed
feeling of enjoyment and doubt. The Apple litigation reflects some deep
confusions within antitrust law. But what, short of a wholesale rewrite of
history, including doctrines, statutes, and treatises, can provide a cure?
Professor Sagers wants to expand the normative criteria that currently inform
antitrust analysis. For example, he discusses how the Second Circuit should
have considered benefits to authors from the Apple agreements. Such benefits
would be excluded from current antitrust analysis which focuses exclusively
on benefits to consumers from reduced prices. In addition, Professor Sagers
argues that the court failed to consider the importance of book publishing to
developing a literary culture, an ambition not countenanced within marginalist
economic analysis. These broader normative concerns with non-consumer
interests and cultural values are arguably more consistent with historical and
institutional analyses of markets. Although Professor Sagers touches upon
these points, further elaboration, perhaps in subsequent scholarship, would be
welcome.
But there is a certain degree of ad hocness to normative considerations. The
alignment between current antitrust law and marginalist economic analysis
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may be resistant to change. There is an iron logic to the connection, made
stronger by strains of conservative and liberal politics in the United States.
This rigidity goes beyond the Apple case, surfacing in labels of hipster
antitrust, merger decisions that increase market concentration, and debates
over how antitrust authorities should deal with the tech sector. Professor
Sagers ignores the politics splitting antitrust law, preferring the abstraction of
“popular attitudes.” Avoiding an analysis of politics is understandable given
the illusion of neutrality within legal methodology. Professor Jonathan
Baker’s recent book on antitrust attempts to engage with the perilous political
issues while extolling the traditional emphasis on economic efficiency. 5
Antitrust politics summon the ghost of Thurman Arnold, a prominent antitrust
enforcer and scholar whom Professor Sagers does cite, as does Professor
Baker. But neither embraces Arnold’s whole-hearted commitment to the
practical realities of antitrust enforcement, perhaps because Arnold seems to
have ended his career disillusioned. 6
Professor Sagers has written an ambitious book. Do not be fooled by his
emphasis on a single case. His sights are much broader, as his scholarship
engages in healthy competition with many academics and practitioners
struggling over antitrust’s present and future by grappling with its past. Active
thinkers in antitrust, intellectual property, business law, and innovation policy
will finish reading this book enriched. Professor Sagers’ own agonistic
interaction with the law teaches us about competition, its ambiguities, and its
elusiveness for antitrust law.
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A Reply to Shubha Ghosh
By Chris Sagers 1
I was glad to read Shubha Ghosh’s generous review of my book on the Apple
eBooks litigation, and happy to write this response, which I hope will clarify a
few things. I was pleased by his characterization of the book’s breadth, as its
philosophical aims go pretty far beyond the one lawsuit it uses as a case study.
I was also glad for the book to be reviewed for IP readers, because innovation
always seemed like such an important part of the story, and I was glad that he
liked my history of American publishing. I very much appreciate his
recommendation of the book to other readers.
My need is much less to dispute his views or rebut criticisms, than just to
clarify some ways that I think he mistook me. He seems to have
misunderstood my point of view in a fundamental way. The fault is probably
mine for not explaining myself better, but without understanding these issues,
assessments of the book will be pretty misleading or inapt.
Professor Ghosh states what I take to be his own view that antitrust should not
focus single-mindedly on prices. “The Apple litigation,” he says, “shows why
[an] abstracted view of competition” preoccupied with prices “is limiting and
misleading.” That sort of thing is now a standard criticism of antitrust and the
conservative ideology that has made it what it’s come to be. Other social
values are at stake, the argument goes. In a case like Apple, they include the
interests of authors, independent booksellers, literary culture, and more, all of
which could be imperiled by a preoccupation with price competition alone.
He’s entitled to his own opinion, but the problem is that he seems to think I
share it. I was troubled enough by that that I re-read the entire book to see how
fairly I could be taken that way. I’ll take the blame, I suppose, and I chalk it up
to the effort I made to be fair to conflicting views in the fraught, complex,
long-fought struggle over issues of competition and social values. If you spend
too much time trying to give each argument its due, you risk your own view
getting lost in the mix. In any case, I cannot stress enough how much
Professor Ghosh has mistaken me, and a lesson for this author in future will be
to cut to the chase a little more quickly and with less caution.
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Professor Ghosh apparently took the book to argue that Apple was wrongly
decided, or at least poorly reasoned, for not considering values other than low
retail prices. He thinks I “want[] to expand the normative criteria that currently
inform antitrust analysis,” and to “dissect[] the Second Circuit’s logic,”
because the court “should have considered benefits to authors from the Apple
agreements” or “the importance of book publishing to developing a literary
culture.” I guess he thought I included brief digressions on German historicism
and the early American Institutionalists to demonstrate how I think antitrust
should be done: that in individual cases, we may need to conduct in-depth,
particularized histories of the markets in question, to see if anything about
them requires special legal treatment. We can’t just ask whether given conduct
caused prices to go up or down and decide on that basis whether it was
desirable or not. He does not really say this explicitly, but as a practical
matter, if we take that approach we imply that some markets are not suited to
vigorous price competition, and as far as antitrust policy goes, the only reason
to imply it is one specific policy prescription. If there really are markets like
that, then maybe firms within them should be allowed to engage in things that
antitrust would otherwise make illegal. If price competition itself can
sometimes imperil important social values, then firms should be permitted to
dampen that competition with trade-restraining contracts, exclusion of
competitors, or market-concentrating mergers. So far as I can tell, Professor
Ghosh took me to argue that this is how we should do antitrust.
My point is diametrically, emphatically, overwhelmingly the opposite. The
whole reason for writing the book was to argue the opposite. Its driving force
is that we should generalize, with simplified legal rules, and we should not try
to make allowances for idiosyncrasies that might suit particular markets poorly
to price competition. The book argues that, despite how things may
superficially seem, idiosyncrasies don’t create special cases, hardly ever.
Notwithstanding the lamentations of every defendant who ever set foot in
court, few markets are actually special in antitrust-relevant respects. The
problem is not that some markets are special, but that all competition is painful
when it works as it’s supposed to, but it’s still the system we’ve got and we
don’t get better results by restraining it. I’ve studied such things a lot in prior
work, including in a few whole books and several articles asking whether the
dozens of exemptions we’ve had over the life of antitrust, designed to address
purportedly special market circumstances, were really justified. The
overwhelming evidence is that they were not. 2 So not only do I not think the
Apple opinion was wrong or poorly reasoned. I think the prevailing caselaw
identifies its normative criteria in a way that is pretty okay, so long as “price”
competition is understood the way I think it should be. A preoccupation with
prices seems bad only if “price competition” is understood according to the
caricature favored by some conservatives and by their left-leaning critics.
Professor Ghosh repeats that caricature here in his own criticism of
mainstream antitrust. 3 Instead, price competition means comparatively
numerous, autonomous units vying non-cooperatively for the same customers,
on the basis of quality-adjusted price. Accordingly, I think that simple, proenforcement antitrust rules, applied pretty generally and across the board, are
the way to go.
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In other words, the problem in antitrust is not that the law fails to account for
non-price values, as was alleged by the many critics of the Apple eBooks
litigation. It is that the broader public fails to appreciate why and how
thoroughly the law doesn’t have to.
I should clarify one point of technical antitrust doctrine. While I believe in
price competition, and, like Hovenkamp, take it that in antitrust we are mostly
marginalists now, 4 none of this means that courts should actually measure
prices. This actually reflects a point of common confusion. Antitrust courts in
fact almost never do that. Except in certain narrow circumstances, antitrust is a
tort-style law enforcement regime that measures conduct and not prices, and
that’s how I want it. 5 It’s just that I think that those conduct rules must be
designed to encourage vigorous competition on the basis of quality-adjusted
price, meaning that it should bar trade-restraining conspiracy, unilateral
exclusion, and merger that generates concentration or strategic advantage.
Defendants don’t then need the opportunity to turn cases into graduate socialscience seminars, à la institutionalism or historicism, because what we find on
extended consideration is that their markets never really need the special
clemency they think they’ve got coming. Publishing is just another in a
centuries long series of examples proving it.
And so, ironically enough, the reason I included the part of the book that
Professor Ghosh liked best—several chapters on the history of American
publishing—was the opposite of defending case-specific institutionalism. I
should probably have been much more clear about that too. My point was to
show that if we just go ahead and do what institutionalist critics want, and
look at particular cases with in-depth care, we won’t actually get different
results than theoretical abstraction would lead you to expect. I said, in effect,
“fine, let’s have a look. As I predicted before we even started arguing, we will
find that the behavior, motivations, and outcomes are pretty much what price
theory would have predicted.” For as long as there has been publishing,
publishers have argued that they cannot cope with price competition, and as
long as there has been an independent bookselling sector, both publishers and
booksellers have argued that maverick retailers must be constrained, or else
the sky will fall. Since at least the early 19th century, they’ve been organizing
price cartels with both horizontal and vertical components, largely
indistinguishable from the eBooks conspiracy of 2010-2012. Those
conspiracies have usually been initiated and coordinated from downstream, as
one expects in RPM arrangements meant to enforce retail collusion. And in
that history, the publishers and booksellers have provided a nice little natural
experiment. British bookselling was governed by a legalized, industry-wide
RPM consortium for nearly the entire twentieth century, but American
bookselling never was, and both had comparable experiences.
So when Amazon introduced a radically price-cutting innovation in
bookselling in 2007—almost single-handedly creating the new eBooks sector
and selling new-releases for a third of their hard-cover price—the industry
complained that they needed collusion to constrain very novel, technologically
unprecedented circumstances. But they were lying. They dealt with an old
problem in the same way they’d done for 200 years.
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Anyway, I then did what I would think any good institutionalist would
demand, and attempted to generalize this observation with case-specific
comparisons to other industries. And it turns out that cartels with vertical
components were not unique to publishing and bookselling. They followed
essentially the same pattern throughout mass retail, all throughout the 19th and
early 20th centuries. That was the point. It was not that publishing must be
understood only according to its own idiosyncrasies, or that we actually need
in-depth historical studies in order to apply the law. It was to prove that we
don’t need to keep doing them, routinely, every time some defendant says
their market is special. There has never been a defendant in antitrust that
didn’t think its market was special, but we just really haven’t found, in the
hundreds or thousands of times that we’ve given them the benefit of the doubt,
that they were right.
Finally, the book clarifies at some length that I don’t think these things
because markets are magic or because they were sent here for our benefit by
God. I point out specific ways in which markets do in fact seem problematic,
and the particular macro and dynamic respects in which they fail us severely.
But the argument that follows is just a simple point of policy. Those ways in
which markets fail would not be well addressed by the one policy correction
that could possibly be relevant to antitrust law: allowing private firms to solve
them through arrangements that reduce price competition. It hasn’t worked
when it’s been tried, and it won’t work going forward. Instead, as I say several
times in the book, we should let competition do what it does well, and solve
other problems with solutions that could actually address them. Trying to
address them by restraining market-by-market price competition is treating
real sickness with the wrong medicine.
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then “competition is functioning.” That is, low prices are not their own goal,
unless one understands “price” to mean quality-adjusted price, defines “low”
to mean “least margin above cost,” and requires that the “prices” that are
supposed to be “low” in this sense are all prices, and not just end-use retail
price. Even then, price is only instrumental. The goal of encouraging low
quality-adjusted price is not to have low prices or to favor retail end-users. It is
to secure a range of social benefits, which only begin with static allocational
efficiency. The benefits might also include dynamic innovation, better
distributional equity, reduction of concentrations of undue political power, and
so on.
4
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